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sublime as the properly anarchic aesthetic, as the dissolution of all boundaries, also serves as the ideological vehicle of many of the values he believed his painting undermined. In his famous essay of 1948, 'The Sublime is Now', Newman's identification of sublimity with the American modernist aesthetic, in contrast to the European concern with matters of mere beauty, unwittingly contributes to the wider myths sustaining American notions of cultural identity, in other words, the belief in America as the land of (implicitly masculine) self-assertion, free enterprise, rugged individualism, which underpinned the ideology of free capitalist America. It is well-known that Pollock, both as painter and as public icon, easily fitted into this ideology, yet it appears in Newman's rather more spiritualized works too, albeit in sublimated form. For the capacity of Newman's painting to be appropriated to support the political rhetoric of the time does not necessarily indicate capitalism's ability to domesticate and recoup everything, even its own negation. Rather, it stems from the fact that the features of Newman's ceuvre unconsciously lent it to such uses through the political meanings of sublimity.9
In this paper I intend to explore these issues as they relate to the problem of Pollock. Specifically, I intend to examine the ideological reference of Pollock's painting, focusing in particular on his interest in the unconscious. In the debate over the political meaning of Pollock's work, the concern with the unconscious which Pollock exhibited has been frequently omitted from the equation. Guilbaut's study displays little interest in the unconscious as an element in Pollock, while at the other extreme Polcari seems to suggest that the psychological interest excludes the political dimension to Pollock. That is, of course, quite startling given that so much contemporary psychoanalytic writing, specifically Lacanian and post-Lacanian theory, is concerned precisely with the intersection of politics and psychoanalysis.10 Hence I wish to suggest that the political meanings of Abstract Expressionism are related directly to the psychological theories underpinning so much Abstract Expressionist practice, not only in terms of Pollock's interest in Jung (albeit in popularized form), but also in terms of the visual metaphors chosen by Pollock to symbolize the unconscious. I shall be arguing that both Pollock's symbolic language and the conception of the unconscious which that language represents, in a manner parallel to Newman's aesthetic of the sublime, unwittingly bear the imprint of capitalist ideology, and that it is this which allows one to speak of the politics of Abstract Expressionism, rather than the grander, but ultimately problematic claims made by Guilbaut.
I 'The Source of my Painting is the Unconscious.'l
One of the principal issues in approaching the question of the unconscious in Pollock's work is how to interpret his claim regarding the unconscious as the source of his painting. His often cited assertion is, perhaps, overly familiar, yet the question as to whether the unconscious in Pollock functions as the source of production or as the subject of representation nevertheless merits consideration. If we see it as the source of production, of Pollock's productive energies, it is necessary to psychoanalyse Pollock in order to understand both the semi-figurative symbolic language of his earlier paintings and drawings and also the abstract, 'poured' paintings for which he gained his fame. On the other hand, if the unconscious is recognised as the represented content of the paintings, analysing Pollock achieves little, since according to this argument he would be painting under the guidance of a theory of the unconscious, and hence the putative spontaneity of even his automatism would have to be read as something other than spontaneous. This is not to imply that Pollock did not produce the drip paintings spontaneously, since of course he did; what it does imply is that it is necessary to explore why Pollock chose to paint in this way, a decision reached after a period of some deliberation.
The These considerations naturally lead on to the question of how to interpret the drip paintings, which, as Hal Foster has argued,'5 rather than being unmediated images of the unconscious are highly metaphorized representations of a conception of the nature of the unconscious. Following Foster's argument, there is no reason to assume that Pollock's works are 'truer', more authentic images of the unconscious than those of any other artist, since the very idea of overcoming mediation in the abstract representation of a theoretical subject is incoherent. This is true, also, of the first experiment in automatism, namely Surrealism, which as Laurent Jenny has pointed out, was similarly caught up in a paradoxical rhetoric, both reaching out towards a pre-symbolic consciousness and also privileging a specific symbolic language as the authentic expression of this consciousness.'6 Hence the claim that the unconscious functions as the unmediated source of production is simply untenable in the failure to recognise the mediated nature of the symbolic artefact. 17 The added strength of the sociopolitical approach to the question is apparent, too, in its ability to explain the presence of Jungian elements in the drawings. Unless one is to maintain a strongly Jungian line, arguing that the motifs in Pollock's drawings constitute products of the unconscious at work, a reawakening, as it were, of repressed archetypes, it has to be recognised that they display such a degree of deliberate, conscious control that their proximity toJungian symbols is more explicable in terms of a conscious effort by Pollock to articulate in visual terms an emergent interest in psychology, guided by a fashionable theory of the time. Indeed, even if we take Kuspit's view that Pollock happily colluded in aJungian interpretation of his drawings because of a personal interest in doing so, the fact that he chose a Jungian reading has to be explained in socio-cultural terms, not by appeal to some pseudoconcept of psychic health. 
II
At this point in the discussion, it may of course be argued that Pollock was in fact aiming at a radical critique of capitalist society, that he would have been the last to have colluded in the promotion of capitalism, in affirming its production of a system of generalised indifference and equivalence. This is certainly the general tenor of Polcari's rejection of Guilbaut, namely that Pollock's declared intent ran counter to everything that Guilbaut and others have seen in his work. Indeed, even if we grant that the psychoanalytic drawings and the paintings of the early 40s may be guilty of such a falsifying, levelling appropriation of myth, it might be objected that when we move to the abstract paintings of the later 40s, there are scant grounds for claiming that Pollock is (unconsciously) supporting the rationalising, reifying, effect of capitalism. There are two different criticism presented here, and I shall deal with each in turn.
First, the argument that Pollock intended a radically anticapitalist type of art, indeed believed he had found inspiration for it in the psychoanalytic writings ofJung andJungianism, fails to account for the ideological nature of his concerns. I am referring here to the political unconscious at work, to the fact thatJungianism, despite its avowedly 'spiritual' concerns, can itself be considered as an expressionism of late capitalist consciousness, and to the fact that certain forms of resistance at a deeper level only succeed in replicating the features of the negated object. Pollock If it is the case that in Deleuze-Guattari primacy is accorded to the desiring-machines of the unconscious (a term which for obvious reasons would have to remain sous rature), and if it is the desiring-machines which themselves produce social reality, this has to be played off against the Lacanian position which inverts the relation of desire and social reality (the symbolic). In Lacan, desire is seen as produced by the symbolic, and this not merely the result of a lapse into the 'errors' of psychoanalysis criticised in Anti-Oedipus. Rather, it results from the role of language in the splitting of the subject, whereby the ego becomes such for others by the agency of the letter. The process leading to ego-formation, becoming a signifier for other signifiers (egos), is also the process whereby the self becomes alienated from itself through the mediation of the symbolic. The ego is thus produced by the dialectic of identity and non-identity, where the identity supposedly guaranteed by the signifier 'I' is contradicted by the non-coincidence of subject and signifier, indicated, for example, by the shifting status of the 'I'. As Lacan argues: 'man cannot aim at being whole ... while ever the play of displacement and condensation to which he is doomed in the exercise of his functions marks his relation as a subject to the signifier.'36 This is, of course, the theory of the mature Lacan in papers such as 'The Signification of the Phallus' and 'The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious',37 but it is also central to Lacan's earlier work on the mirror stage, where the subject is caught between the imaginary unity of the specular image and the actual motor incapacity of the infant. It is within this field, generated by the non-self-coincidence of the subject, that desire takes its place too, for desire is produced by the tension between the subject's lack and the demand for unconditional fulfilment by the Other. In other words, demand always has to pass through the mediation of language, its object is the Other as the locus of the signifier; the demand for satisfaction becomes demand for love of the Other. Since the metonymic chain of signifiers is never stable, this demand for total fulfilment always remains unfulfilled. Lacan notes:
'Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need',38 a consequence of the 'difference that results from the subtraction of [ Alongside this type of reading, however, asymbolic experience can also be interpreted as essentially dynamic and mobile, as an anarchic collection of contradictory drives and impulses, a conception equally resistant to structure, but this time not due to a oneness preceding division and structuring, but rather an utterly random multiplicity irreducible to any logical order. Quite clearly this is the reading chosen by Deleuze and Guattari in their resistance to Freudianism. In art-historical terms one might also think of the precedent of Dada and its fascination with the chaotic, and consequently the dissonance in certain of Pollock's works observed by Clark can be read as symptomatic of this alternative conception. Given this oscillation between the harmonious and the dissonant it is tempting to conclude that we are faced with a conflict of interpretations; it is as if Pollock himself cannot decide which metaphor is more appropriate. Ultimately, however, the significance of this presence in Pollock both of unity (Stokes' 'is-ness') and the disharmonious perhaps points beyond any putative indecision on the part of Pollock towards the dialectical relation between the two, where absolute dissonance passes over into the indifferent oneness so central to Pollock's works. Musicologically one can see a similar problem in the compositions of Schoenberg, which Adorno analysed in his Philosophy of Modern Music.
As is well-known, Schoenberg's expression of modern subjectivity occurs through his dissolution of traditional tonal melodic structures, replacing them with the dissonance of his twelve-tone technique. Thus 'all restricting principles of selection in tonality have been discarded',45 being supplanted by pure atonality, a technique which in its negation of canonical musical structure functions as the mimesis of the more general dissonance of modernity. Yet while in Adorno's account Schoenberg remains the Modernist hero, pursuing the logic of disruption to its conclusion (in contrast to the 'regressive' tendencies in Stravinsky), Adorno is at the same time aware that the production of pure atonality leads to a dead end, to a point where dissonance loses its meaning and ceases to function as such. Adorno admits: 'the foolish reproach of the layman against the monotony of modern music ... contains a grain of truth ... Differentiation is only of any force when it distinguishes itself from that which is already established.'46 Thus Schoenberg's neglect of the dialectic of identity and difference leads to state of pure indifference where 'the very universality of dissonance has suspended the concept itself,47 where in the absence of any tonal structure against which atonality can be measured, atonalities 'no longer even sound out of tune'.48
Given my earlier remarks on the question of oneness and homogeneity in Pollock, it is hopefully clear where the current argument is leading. Following Adorno, the espousal of absolute non-identity or pure difference as a strategy of resistance to modernity ends up repeating the same reifying effect of commodification it attempted to oppose. Moreover, this is a problem which besets the drip paintings of Pollock, one which fatally undermines their status as a radical critique of the rationalizing abstraction of Modernity. What I mean here is that the dissonance in Pollock's paintings, while undoubtedly an element which has to be recognized, does not actually amount to very much. In other words, the works which Clark singles out as being quite different from those paintings exhibiting an undifferentiated wholeness, ultimately fail to distinguish themselves significantly enough for them to emerge as a markedly different type of painting. Against the general background 'noise' of dribbled paint the signs of dissonance, of hesitancy, ofdishevelment, lose their impact. The resulting overall effect is of a generalized dissonance which produces the same effect as the other more explicitly 'whole' works.
What underlies this contradiction in Pollock is the problematic of the discourse sustaining his artistic production, and more specifically its anti-rationalist conception of primal experience. For, as with Pollock and Schoenberg, this discourse of primal experience unwittingly replicates the object of its criticism, namely the oppressive homogeneity of modernity in all its forms. Much the same can be said of DeleuzeGuattari, too, whose anti-Oedipal schizoanalysis of the desiring-machines of the unconscious shares so much with the dissonant works of Pollock. Through their refusal to confront the dialectic of identity and non-identity, they lack the means to make meaningful distinctions between the plurality of desiringmachines, resulting in a single, undifferentiated general desire. Here the equation of desire and the machine is of particular significance in the replication of the effects of the hypertrophy of (technological) reason. 49 As a consequence of the criticisms outlined above the discourse of primacy, of immediacy, is presented with two alternatives. Either it clings to a pure irrationalism which, through its lack of concrete determinacy, reproduces the anonymous, featureless landscape which rational identification is itself accused of producing, or, in order to avoid this indeterminate, empty, levelling abstraction, i.e. in order to explain how one has specific thoughts, it has to gain determinacy by taking on conceptual concretion. In this regard one can draw on the comments of Adorno that 'there is no so-called principle which, in order to be thought at all, does not require precisely that which, according to its own determination, it excludes'.50 We have seen this operative in Schoenberg's progression towards complete atonality, and so here, too, in Pollock (and Deleuze-Guattari) pure non-identity, pure flux, pass over into identity. Of course, at the heart of Adorno's criticism lies his own insistence on the necessity of resisting conceptual reification not by espousal of pure non-conceptuality, but by pursuing the dialectic of concept and non-concept, identity and non-identity, rational thought and nonrational experience. It is a form of immanent critique which consists of an engagement with 'full unreduced experience in the medium of conceptual reflection',51 where one 'must strive, by way of the concept, to transcend the concept',52 rather than simply negating it in the name of non-conceptuality.
This criticism, if accepted, explains, too, why what I have termed the vitalist discourse of immediacy in Pollock's drip paintings has always failed as a strategy of resistance. Simply, it has the character of a peculiarly bourgeois form of critique which reproduces the features of the capitalist culture it seeks to subvert. A form of consciousness increasingly regularized and levelled by the hegemonic patterns of identification engendered by the principle of exchange has conceived of the Other in a form which is readily cognisable, readily identifiable, as the complete dissolution of identity. But as in the case of Schoenberg's extreme atonality, non-identity in this process loses its meaning, and hence nothing is exchangeable and at the same time everything is. Far from being undermined, the governing principle of identity has in fact been reinforced since it succeeds in overcoming the threat of its absolute Other, which turns out to be merely its mirror image. The oscillation between identity and non-identity in Pollock, with the eventual triumph of the identical finds a curious parallel in Sol LeWitt, who in works such as Floor Piece # 4 or 122 Variations of Incomplete Open Cubes depicts an obsessive, decentered rationality, 'a world', as Rosalind Krauss puts it, 'of substitutions and transpositions nowhere legitimated by the revelations of a transcendent subject'.53 Despite its obvious orientation to the rationalities of geometrical reason, this world nevertheless bears many marked similarities to that of Pollock's drip paintings, especially when one considers the lack in LeWitt's work of any organizing centre, a decentering which mirrors the all-over character of Pollock. Comparison of the two raises a number of interesting questions, most notably the fact that whereas hitherto Pollock's automatism has been seen as the sign of an absolute subjectivity obeying only its own impulses, exactly the same feature in LeWitt leads Krauss to interpret his works as emblems of a hypertrophic, subjectless mechanistic rationality. Significantly, Krauss formulates her reading in opposition to Kuspit, who saw in LeWitt a celebration of rational clarity, whereas for Krauss LeWitt is articulating a critique of the relentless rationalizing process of modernity which has turned into an instru-ment ofdomination. Now, although my own tendency is to favour the reading of Krauss, I do not intend to argue definitely for the one interpretation over the other, since my interest is in the fact that the same works can be seen as either celebrating the power of rational subjective thought or condemning the negation of the subject through the uncontrolled expansion of rationalization. For there is a parallel here with Pollock, who in his putative absolutization of a primal subjectivity has ultimately elevated the content of his works to the level of a subjectless, empty and abstract generality. In other words absolute subjectivity is the negation of the subject. The desiring-machines of the unconscious are precisely machines. I have explored in this paper the ideological content of this latter consequences in Pollock's drip paintings, but I am not thereby contending that they do not represent a primal subjectivity. Rather, I am arguing that Pollock can be read in two ways, and that it is not a matter of choosing between them, of counting one and discounting the other. Instead one must recognise that the two belong together, that Pollock's automatism and all-over style have these other meanings not necessarily intended by Pollock himself, that his particular set of interests and their symbolism bore considerable ideological weight from the beginning and that, finally, the politicization of Abstract Expressionism follows from the ideology of the drip.
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